

WILEY



Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction

Author(s): David Harvey

Source: *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, Vol. 88, No. 2, Geography and Power, the Power of Geography (2006), pp. 145-158

Published by: [Wiley](#) on behalf of the [Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3878384>

Accessed: 21-08-2015 19:21 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Wiley and Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

NEO-LIBERALISM AS CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

by
David Harvey

Harvey, D., 2006: Neo-liberalism as creative destruction. *Geogr. Ann.*, 88 B (2): 145–158.

ABSTRACT. Neoliberalization has swept across the world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment, entailing much destruction, not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers, but also of divisions of labor, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life, attachments to the land, habits of the heart, ways of thought, and the like. To turn the neoliberal rhetoric against itself, we may reasonably ask: in whose particular interests is it that the state take a neoliberal stance and in what ways have these particular interests used neoliberalism to benefit themselves rather than, as is claimed, everyone, everywhere?

Neoliberalism has spawned a swath of oppositional movements. The more clearly oppositional movements recognize that their central objective must be to confront the class power that has been so effectively restored under neoliberalization, the more they will likely themselves cohere.

Key words: neoliberalism, creative destruction, class power, accumulation by dispossession, privatization, financialization, redistribution, democratic alternatives

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices which proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to be concerned, for example, with the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police and juridical functions required to secure private property rights and to support freely functioning markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as education, health care, social security or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary; but beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices), and because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.

The actual practices of neoliberalism frequently diverge from this template for a variety of rea-

sons. Nevertheless, there has everywhere been an emphatic turn, ostensibly led by the Thatcher/Reagan revolutions in Britain and the US, in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s. State after state, from the new states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some of their policies and practices accordingly. Post-apartheid South Africa quickly embraced the neoliberal frame, and even contemporary China appears to be heading in this direction. Furthermore, the advocates for the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence in education (the universities and many 'think tanks'), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions (treasury departments, the central banks) and also in those international institutions such as the IMF and the WTO that regulate global finance and trade. Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand the world.

Neoliberalization has in effect swept across the world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment, and while there is plenty of evidence of its uneven geographical development, no place can claim total immunity (with the exception of a few states such as North Korea). Furthermore, the rules of engagement now established through the WTO (governing international trade) and by the IMF (governing international finance) instantiate neoliberalism as a global set of rules. All states that sign on to the WTO and the IMF (and who can afford to stay out?) agree to abide (albeit with a 'grace period' to permit smooth adjustment) by these rules or face severe penalties.

The creation of this neoliberal system has obviously entailed much destruction, not only of pri-

or institutional frameworks and powers (such as the supposed prior state sovereignty over political-economic affairs) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life, attachments to the land, habits of the heart, ways of thought, and so on. Some assessment of the positives and negatives of this neoliberal revolution is called for. In what follows, therefore, I will outline some preliminary arguments as to how to both understand and evaluate this transformation in the way global capitalism is working. This requires that we come to terms with the underlying forces, interests and agents that have propelled the neoliberal revolution forward with such relentless intensity. To turn the neoliberal rhetoric against itself, we may reasonably ask: In whose particular interests is it that the state takes a neoliberal stance and in what ways have these particular interests used neoliberalism to benefit themselves rather than, as is claimed, everyone, everywhere?

The 'naturalization' of neoliberalism

For any system of thought to become hegemonic requires the articulation of fundamental concepts that become so deeply embedded in common-sense understandings that they become taken for granted and beyond question. For this to occur not any old concepts will do. A conceptual apparatus has to be constructed that appeals almost 'naturally' to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities that seem to inhere in the social world we inhabit. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of individual liberty and freedom as sacrosanct, as 'the central values of civilization', and in so doing they chose wisely and well, for these are indeed compelling and great attractors as concepts. These values were threatened, they argued, not only by fascism, dictatorships and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals set free to choose. They then concluded that without 'the diffused power and initiative associated with (private property and the competitive market) it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved'.¹

Leaving aside the question of whether the final part of the argument necessarily follows from the first, there can be no doubt that the concepts of liberty and freedom of the individual are powerful and appealing in their own right, even beyond those ter-

rains where the liberal tradition has had a strong historical presence. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the students in Tiananmen Square. The student movement that swept the world in 1968 – from Paris and Chicago to Bangkok and Mexico City – was in part animated by the quest for greater freedoms of speech and of individual choice. These ideals have proven again and again to be a powerful historical force for change.

Hardly surprisingly, therefore, appeals to freedom and liberty surround us rhetorically at every turn and populate all manner of contemporary political manifestos. This has been particularly true of the United States in recent years. On the first anniversary of the attacks now known as '9/11', President Bush, for example, wrote an op-ed piece for the *New York Times* that extracted ideas from the US National Defense Strategy document issued shortly thereafter. 'A peaceful world of growing freedom,' he wrote (as the US geared up to go to war with Iraq), 'serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals and unites America's allies.' 'Humanity,' he concluded, 'holds in its hands the opportunity to offer freedom's triumph over all its age-old foes' and 'the United States welcomes its responsibilities to lead in this great mission.' Even more emphatically, he later proclaimed that 'freedom is the Almighty's gift to every man and woman in this world' and 'as the greatest power on earth (the US has) an obligation to help the spread of freedom.'²

So when all the other reasons for engaging in a pre-emptive war against Iraq were proven fallacious or at least wanting, the Bush Administration appealed increasingly to the idea that the freedom conferred upon Iraq was in and of itself an adequate justification for the war. But what sort of 'freedom' was envisaged here, since, as the cultural critic Mathew Arnold long ago thoughtfully observed: 'freedom is a very good horse to ride, but to ride somewhere (cited in Williams, 1958, p. 118).' To what destination, then, were the Iraqi people expected to ride the horse of freedom so selflessly donated to them by force of arms?

The US answer was spelled out on 19 September, 2003, when Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, promulgated four orders that included 'the full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits...the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control,

national treatment for foreign companies and...the elimination of nearly all trade barriers (Juhasz, 2004).' The orders were to apply to all areas of the economy, including public services, the media, manufacturing, services, transportation, finance and construction. Only oil was exempt. A regressive tax system favoured by conservatives called a flat tax was also instituted. The right to strike was outlawed and unions banned in key sectors. An Iraqi member of the Coalition Provisional Authority protested the forced imposition of 'free market fundamentalism,' describing it as 'a flawed logic that ignores history (Crampton, 2003, p. C5).' However, the interim Iraqi government appointed at the end of June 2004 was accorded no power to change or write new laws: it could only confirm the decrees already promulgated.

What the US evidently sought to impose upon Iraq was a full-fledged neoliberal state apparatus whose fundamental mission was and is to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation for all comers, Iraqis and foreigners alike. The Iraqis were, in short, expected to ride their horse of freedom straight into the coral of neoliberalism. According to neoliberal theory, Bremer's decrees are both necessary and sufficient for the creation of wealth and therefore for the improved well-being of the Iraqi people. They are the proper foundation for an adequate rule of law, individual liberty and democratic governance. The insurrection that followed can in part be interpreted, therefore, as Iraqi resistance to being driven into the embrace of free market fundamentalism against their own free will.

It is useful to recall, however, that the first great experiment with neoliberal state formation was Chile following Pinochet's coup almost thirty years to the day before Bremer's decrees were issued, on the 'little September 11th' of 1973. The coup, against the democratically elected and leftist social democratic government of Salvador Allende, was strongly backed by the CIA and supported by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It violently repressed all the social movements and political organizations of the Left and dismantled all forms of popular organization (such as the community health centres in poorer neighbourhoods). The labour market was 'freed' from regulatory or institutional restraints (for example, trade union power). However, by 1973 the policies of import substitution that had formerly dominated in Latin American attempts at economic regeneration (and which had succeeded to some degree in Brazil after the

military coup of 1964) had fallen into disrepute. With the world economy in the midst of a serious recession, something new was plainly called for. A group of US economists, known as 'the Chicago boys' because of their attachment to the neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman then teaching at the University of Chicago, were summoned to help reconstruct the Chilean economy. They did so along free market lines, privatizing public assets, opening up natural resources to private exploitation and facilitating foreign direct investment and free trade. The right of foreign companies to repatriate profits from their Chilean operations was guaranteed. Export-led growth was favoured over import substitution. The subsequent revival of the Chilean economy in terms of growth rates, capital accumulation, and high rates of return on foreign investments, provided evidence upon which the subsequent turn to more open neoliberal policies both in Britain (under Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan) could be modelled. Not for the first time, a brutal experiment in creative destruction carried out in the periphery became a model for the formulation of policies in the centre (Valdez, 1995).

The fact that two such obviously similar restructurings of the state apparatus occurred at such different times in quite different parts of the world under the coercive influence of the United States might be taken as indicative. It suggests that the grim reach of US imperial power might lie behind the rapid proliferation of neoliberal state forms throughout the world from the mid-1970s onwards. While there have been strong elements of this at work over the past thirty years, this is by no means constitutive of the whole story. It was not the US, after all, that forced Margaret Thatcher to take the neoliberal path she took in 1979, and during the early 1980s Thatcher was a far more consistent advocate of neoliberalism than Reagan ever proved to be. Nor was it the US that forced China in 1978 to begin upon a path of liberalization which has brought it closer and closer to the embrace of neoliberalism over time. It would be hard to attribute the moves towards neoliberalism in India and Sweden in 1992 to the imperial reach of US power. The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism on the world stage has been, evidently, a very complex process entailing multiple determinations and not a little chaos and confusion. So why, then, did the neoliberal turn occur and what were the forces compelling it onward to the point where it has now become so hegemonic a system within global capitalism?

Why the neoliberal turn?

Towards the end of the 1960s global capitalism was falling into disarray. Serious recession occurred in early 1973 – the first since the great slump of the 1930s. The oil embargo and oil price hike that occurred later that year in the wake of the Arab–Israeli war exacerbated already serious problems. It was clear that the ‘embedded capitalism’ of the postwar period with its heavy emphasis upon some sort of uneasy compact between capital and labour brokered by an interventionist state that paid great attention to the social (i.e. welfare state) as well as the individual wage, was no longer working. The Bretton Woods system set up to regulate international trade and finance was finally abandoned in favour of floating exchange rates in 1973. This system had delivered high rates of growth in the advanced capitalist countries and generated some spill-over benefits (most obviously to Japan but also unevenly across South America and to some other countries of South East Asia) during the ‘golden age’ of capitalism in the 1950s and early 1960s. But it was now exhausted and some alternative was obviously needed to restart the processes of capital accumulation (Armstrong *et al.*, 1991). Whatever reforms were achieved, they obviously had to seek to re-establish appropriate conditions for the revival of capital accumulation. How and why neoliberalism emerged victorious as the only possible answer to this problem is a far too complicated story to detail here. In retrospect it may seem that the answer was both inevitable and obvious, but at the time I think it is fair to say that no one really knew or understood with any certainty what kind of answer would work and how. The world stumbled towards neoliberalism as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic motions that really only converged upon neoliberalism as the new orthodoxy with the construction of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s. The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently partial and lopsided application from one state and social formation to another, testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred.

There is, however, one element within this transition that deserves specific attention. The crisis of capital accumulation in the 1970s affected everyone through the combination of rising unemploy-

ment and accelerating inflation. Discontent was widespread, and the conjoining of labour and urban social movements throughout much of the advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post-war period. Communist and socialist parties were gaining ground across much of Europe, and even in the United States popular forces were agitating for widespread reforms and state interventions in everything ranging from environmental protection to occupational safety and health and consumer protection from corporate malfeasance. There was, in this, a clear *political* threat to ruling classes everywhere, both in the advanced capitalist countries (such as Italy and France) as well as in many developing countries (such as Mexico and Argentina), but beyond this, the *economic* threat to the position of the ruling classes was now becoming palpable. One condition of the post-war settlement in almost all countries was that the economic power of the upper classes be restrained and that labour be accorded a much larger share of the economic pie. In the US, for example, the share of the national income taken by the top 1% of income earners fell from a pre-war high of 16% to less than 8% by the end of the Second World War and stayed close to that level for nearly three decades. While growth was strong this restraint seemed not to matter, but when growth collapsed in the 1970s, when real interest rates went negative, and paltry dividends and profits were all that were possible then, the ruling class itself felt deeply threatened economically. Ruling classes had to move decisively if they were to protect their power from political and economic annihilation.

The coup in Chile and the military takeover in Argentina, both fomented and led internally by ruling elites with US support, provided one kind of solution, but the Chilean experiment with neoliberalism demonstrated that the benefits of revived capital accumulation were highly skewed. The country and its ruling elites along with foreign investors did well enough, while the people in general fared badly. This has been a persistent enough effect of neoliberal policies over time as to be regarded as structural to the whole project. Indeed, Dumenil and Levy go so far as to argue that neoliberalism was from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class power to the richest strata in the population. They show how from the mid-1980s onwards the share of the top 1% of income earners

soared suddenly to reach 15% by the end of the century. Other data show that the top 0.1% of income earners increased their share of the national income from 2% in 1978 to over 6% by 1999. Another measure shows that the ratio of the median compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from just over thirty to one in 1970 to more than four hundred to one by 2000. Almost certainly, with the Bush Administration's tax cuts now taking effect, the concentration of income and of wealth in the upper echelons of society is continuing apace (Dumenil and Levy, 2004, p. 4; see also Task Force, 2004, p.3) and the US is not alone in this: the top 1% of income earners in Britain have doubled their share of the national income from 6.5% to 13% over the past twenty years, when we look further afield we see the extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power within a small oligarchy after neoliberal 'shock therapy' had been administered to Russia, and an extraordinary surge in income inequalities and wealth in China as it adopts more neoliberal practices. While there are exceptions to this trend (several East and Southeast Asian countries have contained income inequalities within modest bounds, as have France and the Scandinavian countries), the evidence strongly suggests that the neoliberal turn is in some way and to some degree associated with a project to restore or reconstruct upper-class power.

We can therefore examine the history of neoliberalism either as a utopian project providing a theoretical template for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project concerned both to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and the restoration of class power. In what follows I shall argue that the last of these objectives has dominated. Neoliberalism has not proven good at revitalizing global capital accumulation but it has succeeded remarkably well in restoring class power. As a consequence, the theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has worked more as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever had to be done to restore class power. The principles of neoliberalism are quickly abandoned whenever they conflict with this class project.

Towards the restoration of class power

If there was a movement to restore class power within global capitalism, how was this done and by whom? The answer in countries such as Chile and Argentina was as simple as it was swift, brutal and

sure: a military coup backed by the upper classes and the subsequent fierce repression of all solidarities created within the labour and urban social movements that had so threatened their power. Elsewhere, as in Britain and Mexico in 1976, it took the gentle prodding of a not yet fiercely neoliberal International Monetary Fund to push countries towards a practice (though by no means a policy commitment) to cut back on social expenditures and the welfare state in order to re-establish fiscal probity. In Britain, of course, Margaret Thatcher later took up the neoliberal cudgels with a vengeance in 1979 and wielded them to great effect, even though she never fully overcame opposition within her own party and could never effectively challenge such centrepieces of the welfare state as the National Health Service. Interestingly, it was only in 2004 that the Labour government dared to introduce a fee structure into higher education. The process of neoliberalization has been halting, geographically uneven and heavily influenced by the balance of class and other social forces ranged for or against its central propositions within particular state formations, and even within particular sectors (such as health and education) (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1999).

It is, however, interesting to look more specifically at how the process unfolded in the US, since this case was pivotal in influencing the global transformations that later occurred. In this instance various threads of power intertwined to create a very particular rite of passage that culminated in the Republican Party takeover of Congressional power in the mid-1990s, vowing what was in effect a totally neoliberal 'Contract on America' as a programme of domestic action. But before that point many steps were involved, each building upon and reinforcing the other.

To begin with, there was a growing sense among the upper classes by 1970 or so that the anti-business and anti-imperialist climate that had emerged towards the end of the 1960s had gone too far. In a celebrated memo, Lewis Powell (about to be elevated to the Supreme Court by Nixon) urged the American Chamber of Commerce in 1971 to mount a *collective* campaign to demonstrate that what was good for business was good for America. Shortly thereafter a shadowy but deeply influential and powerful Business Round Table was formed (it still exists and plays a significant strategic role in Republican Party politics). Corporate Political Action Committees (legalized under the post-Watergate campaign finance laws of 1974) proliferated like wildfire and, with their activities judged protected

under the First Amendment as a form of free speech in a 1976 Supreme Court decision, the systematic capture of the Republican Party as the unique class instrument of *collective* (rather than particular and individual) corporate and financial power began. But the Republican Party needed a popular base. This proved more problematic but the incorporation of the leaders of the Christian Right – depicted as a ‘moral majority’ – with the Business Round Table provided the solution. A large segment of a disaffected, insecure and largely white working class was persuaded to systematically vote against its own material interests on cultural (anti-liberal, black, feminist and gay), nationalist and religious grounds. By the mid-1990s the Republican Party had lost almost all of its ‘liberal’ elements and become a homogeneous right wing machine connecting the financial resources of large corporate capital with a populist base among a ‘moral majority’ that was particularly strong in the US South (Edsall, 1984; Court, 2003; Frank, 2004).

The second element to the US transition was the problem of fiscal discipline. The recession of 1973–1975 diminished tax revenues at all levels at a time of rising demand for social expenditures. Deficits emerged everywhere as a key problem. Something had to be done about the fiscal crisis of the state. The restoration of fiscal discipline was essential. This empowered those financial institutions that controlled the lines of credit to the state. In 1975 they refused to roll-over the debt of New York City and forced the city close to the edge of bankruptcy. A powerful cabal of bankers joined together with state power to discipline the city. This meant curbing the aspirations of the city’s powerful municipal unions, lay-offs in public employment, wage freezes, cut-backs in social provision (education, public health, transport services) and imposition of user fees (tuition was introduced in the CUNY university system for the first time). The bail-out entailed the construction of new institutions that had first rights to city tax revenues in order to pay off bond holders: whatever was left went into the city budget for essential services. The final indignity was the requirement that municipal unions invest their pension funds in city bonds to make sure that unions moderated their demands to avoid the danger of losing their pension funds through city bankruptcy.

This amounted to a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically elected government of New York City and it was every bit as effective as the military coup that had occurred earlier

in Chile. Much of the social infrastructure of the city was destroyed and the physical infrastructure (e.g. the transit system) deteriorated markedly for lack of investment or even maintenance. The management of the New York fiscal crisis pioneered the way for neoliberal practices both domestically under Reagan and internationally through the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s. It established the principle that in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions and bond holders on the one hand and the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former was to be preferred. It hammered home the view that the role of government was to create a good business climate rather than look to the needs and well-being of the population at large. Fiscal redistributions of benefit to the upper classes resulted in the midst of a general fiscal crisis. Whether all the agents involved in producing this fiscal compromise in New York understood it at the time as a tactic for the restoration of upper-class power is an open question. The need to maintain fiscal discipline is a matter of deep concern in its own right and does not have to lead to the restoration of class power. It is unlikely, therefore, that Felix Rohatyn, the key merchant banker who brokered the deal between the city, the state and the financial institutions, had the restoration of class power in mind, but this objective was probably very much in the minds of the investment bankers. It was almost certainly the aim of then Secretary of the Treasury William Simon who, having watched the progress of events in Chile with approval, refused to give aid to the city and openly stated that he wanted New York City to suffer so badly that no other city in the nation would ever dare take on social obligations in this way again (Alcaly and Mermelstein, 1977; Tabb, 1982).

The third element in the US transition entailed an ideological assault upon the media and upon educational institutions. Independent ‘think-tanks’ financed by wealthy individuals and corporate donors proliferated (the Heritage Foundation taking the lead) to prepare a discursive onslaught to persuade the public of the common sense of neoliberal propositions. A flood of policy papers and propositions and a veritable hired army of well-paid lieutenants trained to promote neoliberal ideas and ideals coupled with corporate acquisition of media power effectively changed the discursive climate in the US by the mid-1980s. The project to ‘get government off the backs of the people’ and to shrink government to the point where it could be ‘drowned in a bathtub’ was loudly proclaimed. In this the pro-

motors of the new gospel found a ready audience in that wing of the movement of 1968 whose goal was greater individual liberty and freedom from state power and the manipulations of monopoly capital. The libertarian argument for neoliberalism proved a powerful force for change and to the degree that capitalism itself reorganized to both open up a space for individual entrepreneurial endeavours and switch its efforts into satisfying the innumerable niche markets (particularly those defined by sexual liberation) that were spawned out of an increasingly individualized consumerism, so it could match words with deeds.

This carrot of individualized entrepreneurialism and consumerism was backed by the big stick taken by both the state and financial institutions to that other wing of the '68 movement that sought social justice through collective endeavors and social solidarities. Reagan's destruction of the air traffic controllers in 1980 and Margaret Thatcher's defeat of the British miners in 1984 were crucial moments in the global turn towards neoliberalism. The assault upon all those institutions, such as trade unions and welfare rights organizations, that sought to protect and further working-class interests, was as broad as it was deep. In addition, the savage cut-backs in social expenditures and the welfare state, the passing of all responsibility for their well-being to individuals and their families, proceeded apace. However, these practices did not and could not stop at national borders. After 1980 the US, now firmly committed to neoliberalization and clearly backed by Britain, sought, through a mix of leadership, persuasion (the economics departments of US research universities played a major role in training many of the economists from around the world in neoliberal principles) and coercion to export neoliberalization far and wide. The purge of Keynesian economists and their replacement by neoliberal monetarists in the International Monetary Fund in 1982 transformed the IMF (dominated by the US) into a prime agent of neoliberalization through its structural adjustment programmes visited upon any state (and there were many in the 1980s and 1990s) that required its help with debt repayments. The 'Washington Consensus' that was forged in the 1990s, and the negotiating rules set up under the World Trade Organization that was established in 1998, confirmed the global turn towards neoliberal practices (Stiglitz, 2002).

But this international dimension also depended upon the reanimation and reconfiguration of the US imperial tradition. That tradition, arrived at in Central America in the 1920s, sought a form of impe-

rialism without colonies. Independent republics could be kept under the thumb of US influence and effectively act, in the best of cases, as proxies for US interests, by supporting a 'strong man' (e.g. Somoza in Nicaragua, the Shah of Iran and Pinochet in Chile) and a coterie of followers with military assistance and financial aid. Covert assistance was available to promote the rise to power of such leaders, but by the 1970s it became clear that something else was needed: the opening of markets, of new spaces for investment, and clear fields where financial powers could operate securely entailed a much closer integration of the global economy with a well-defined financial architecture. The creation of new institutional practices, such as those set out by the IMF and the WTO, provided convenient vehicles through which financial and market power could be exercised. But for this to happen required collaboration among the most powerful capitalist powers, and the G7 brought Europe and Japan into alignment with the US to shape the global financial and trading system in ways that effectively forced all other nations to submit. 'Rogue nations' defined as those that failed to conform to these global rules could then be dealt with by sanctions or coercive even military force if necessary. In this way US neoliberal imperialist strategies were articulated through a global network of power relations, one effect of which was to permit the US upper classes to exact financial tribute and to command rents from the rest of the world as a means to augment its already overwhelming power (Harvey, 2003).

Neoliberalism as creative destruction

In what ways may it be said that neoliberalization has resolved the problems of flagging capital accumulation? Its actual record in stimulating economic growth is dismal. Aggregate growth rates stood at 3.5% or so in the 1960s and even during the troubled 1970s fell to only 2.4%. But the subsequent global growth rates of 1.4% and 1.1% for the 1980s and 1990s (and a rate that barely touches 1% since 2000) indicate that neoliberalism has broadly failed to stimulate worldwide growth (World Commission, 2004). Even if we exclude from this the catastrophic effects of the collapse of the Russian and some Central European economies in the wake of the neoliberal shock therapy treatment of the 1990s, the global economic performance from the standpoint of restoring the conditions of general capital accumulation has been weak.

In spite of all the rhetoric about curing sick econ-

omies, neither Britain nor the US achieved high levels of economic performance in the 1980s, for example. The 1980s in fact belonged to Japan, the East Asian 'tiger' economies and West Germany as powerhouses of the global economy. The fact that these proved very successful in spite of radically different institutional arrangements makes it difficult to argue for some simple turn to (let alone imposition of) neoliberalism on the world stage as an obvious economic palliative. To be sure, the West German Bundesbank had taken a strongly monetarist line (consistent with neoliberalism) for more than two decades, thus suggesting that there is no necessary connection between monetarism per se and the quest to restore class power. In West Germany the unions remained very strong and wage levels stayed relatively high alongside the construction of a progressive welfare state apparatus. One of the effects was to stimulate a high rate of technological innovation, and this kept West Germany well ahead of the field in international competition. Export-led growth could power the country forward as a global leader. In Japan, independent unions were weak or non-existent, but state investment in technological and organizational change and the tight relationship between corporations and financial institutions (an arrangement that also proved felicitous in West Germany) generated an astonishing export-led growth performance, very much at the expense of other capitalist economies such as the UK and the US. Such growth as there was in the 1980s (and the aggregate rate of growth in the world was lower even than that of the troubled 1970s) did not depend, therefore, upon neoliberalization. Many European states therefore resisted neoliberal reforms and increasingly found ways to preserve much of their social democratic heritage while moving, in some cases fairly successfully, towards the West German model. In Asia, the Japanese model implemented under authoritarian systems of governance in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore also proved viable and consistent with reasonable equality of distribution. It was only in the 1990s that neoliberalization began to pay off for both the US and the UK. This happened in the midst of a long drawn-out period of deflation in Japan and relative stagnation in a newly unified Germany. It is a moot point, however, as to whether the Japanese recession occurred as a simple result of competitive pressures or whether it was engineered by powerful class forces in the US using all their financial power to humble the Japanese economy.

So why, then, in the face of this patchy if not dis-

mal record, have we been so persuaded that neoliberalization is such a successful solution? Over and beyond the persistent stream of propaganda emanating from the neoliberal think-tanks and suffusing the media, two material reasons stand out. First, neoliberalization has been accompanied by increasing volatility within global capitalism. The fact that 'success' was to be had somewhere obscured the fact that neoliberalism was generally failing. The extreme volatility entailed periodic episodes of growth interspersed with intense phases of creative destruction, most usually registered as severe financial crises. Argentina opened itself up to foreign capital and privatization in the 1990s and for several years was the darling of Wall Street, only to collapse into total disaster as international capital withdrew at the end of the decade. Financial collapse and social devastation was quickly followed by a long drawn-out political crisis. Financial crises proliferated all over the developing world and in some instances, such as Brazil and Mexico, repeated waves of structural adjustment and austerity led to economic paralysis.

But neoliberalism has been a huge success from the standpoint of the upper classes. It has either restored class power to ruling elites (as in the US and Britain) or created conditions for capitalist class formation (as in China, India, Russia and elsewhere). Even countries that have suffered extensively from neoliberalization have seen the massive reordering of class structures internally. The wave of privatization that came to Mexico with the Salinas administration in 1992 spawned extraordinary concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few people (such as Carlos Slim who took over the state telephone system and became an instant billionaire). With the media dominated by upper-class interests, the myth could be propagated that territories failed because they were not competitive enough (thereby setting the stage for even more neoliberal reforms). Increased social inequality within a territory was necessary to encourage the entrepreneurial risk and innovation that conferred competitive power and stimulated growth. If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, this was because they failed, usually for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance their own human capital (through dedication to education, the acquisition of a protestant work ethic, submission to work discipline and flexibility and so on). Particular problems arose, in short, due to lack of competitive strength or personal, cultural and political failings. In a Darwinian world, the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive. System-

ic problems were masked under a blizzard of ideological pronouncements and under a plethora of localized crises.

If the main achievements of neoliberalism have been redistributive rather than generative, then ways had to be found to transfer assets and redistribute wealth and income either from the mass of the population towards the upper classes or from vulnerable to richer countries. I have elsewhere provided an account of these mechanisms under the rubric of 'accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003, ch. 4).' By this I mean the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had treated as 'primitive' or 'original' during the rise of capitalism. These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations (as in Mexico and India in recent times); conversion of various forms of property rights (e.g. common, collective, state) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neocolonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slavetrade (which continues particularly in the sex industry); and usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation. The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role both in backing and promoting these processes, and in many instances has resorted to violence. To this list of mechanisms we may now add a raft of additional techniques, such as the extraction of rents from patents and intellectual property rights and the diminution or erasure of various forms of common property rights (such as state pensions, paid vacations, access to education and health care) won through a generation or more of social democratic class struggle. The proposal to privatize all state pension rights (pioneered in Chile under the dictatorship) is, for example, one of the cherished objectives of neoliberals in the US.

While in the cases of China and Russia, it might be reasonable to refer to recent events in 'primitive' and 'original' terms, the practices that restored class power to capitalist elites in the US and elsewhere are best described as an ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession that rose rapidly to prominence under neoliberalism. I isolate four main elements.

1 Privatization

The corporatization, commodification and privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal feature of the neoliberal project. Its primary aim has been to open up new fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability. Public utilities of all kinds (water, telecommunications, transportation), social welfare provision (social housing, education, health care, pensions), public institutions (such as universities, research laboratories, prisons) and even warfare (as illustrated by the 'army' of private contractors operating alongside the armed forces in Iraq) have all been privatized to some degree throughout the capitalist world. The intellectual property rights established through the so-called TRIPS agreement within the WTO defines genetic materials, seed plasmas, and all manner of other products, as private property. Rents for use can then be extracted from populations whose practices had played a crucial role in the development of these genetic materials. Biopiracy is rampant and the pilaging of the world's stockpile of genetic resources is well under way to the benefit of a few large pharmaceutical companies. The escalating depletion of the global environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations that preclude anything but capital-intensive modes of agricultural production have likewise resulted from the wholesale commodification of nature in all its forms. The commodification (through tourism) of cultural forms, histories and intellectual creativity entails wholesale disposessions (the music industry is notorious for the appropriation and exploitation of grass-roots culture and creativity). As in the past, the power of the state is frequently used to force such processes through, even against popular will. The rolling back of regulatory frameworks designed to protect labour and the environment from degradation has entailed the loss of rights. The reversion of common property rights won through years of hard class struggle (the right to a state pension, to welfare, to national health care) into the private domain has been one of the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy. All of these processes amount to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class-privileged domains. Privatization, Arundhati Roy argues with respect to the Indian case, entails 'the transfer of productive public assets from the state to private companies. Productive assets include natural re-

sources. Earth, forest, water, air. These are the assets that the state holds in trust for the people it represents.... To snatch these away and sell them as stock to private companies is a process of barbaric dispossession on a scale that has no parallel in history (Roy, 2001).'

2 *Financialization*

The strong wave of financialization that set in after 1980 has been marked by its speculative and predatory style. The total daily turnover of financial transactions in international markets which stood at \$2.3 billion in 1983 had risen to \$130 billion by 2001. This \$40 trillion annual turnover in 2001 compares to the estimated \$800 billion that would be required to support international trade and productive investment flows (Dicken, ch. 13). Deregulation allowed the financial system to become one of the main centres of redistributive activity through speculation, predation, fraud and thievery. Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency that reduced whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations – all of these became central features of the capitalist financial system. The emphasis on stock values that arose out of bringing together the interests of owners and managers of capital through the remuneration of the latter in stock options led, as we now know, to manipulations in the market that brought immense wealth to a few at the expense of the many. The spectacular collapse of Enron was emblematic of a general process that dispossessed many of their livelihoods and their pension rights. Beyond this, we also have to look at the speculative raiding carried out by hedge funds and other major institutions of finance capital, since these formed the real cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession on the global stage, even as they supposedly conferred the positive benefit for the capitalist class of 'spreading risks.'

3 *The management and manipulation of crises*

Beyond the speculative and often fraudulent froth that characterizes much of neoliberal financial manipulation, there lies a deeper process that entails the springing of 'the debt trap' as a primary means

of accumulation by dispossession. Crisis creation, management and manipulation on the world stage has evolved into the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the rich. By suddenly raising interest rates in 1979, Volcker raised the proportion of foreign earnings that borrowing countries had to put to debt-interest payments. Forced into bankruptcy, countries such as Mexico had to agree to structural adjustment. While proclaiming its role as a noble leader organizing 'bail-outs' to keep global capital accumulation stable and on track, the US could also open up the way to pillage the Mexican economy through deployment of its superior financial power under conditions of local crisis. This was what the US Treasury/Wall Street/IMF complex became expert at doing everywhere. Greenspan at the Federal Reserve deployed the same Volcker tactic several times in the 1990s. Debt crises in individual countries, uncommon during the 1960s, became very frequent during the 1980s and 1990s. Hardly any developing country remained untouched and in some cases, as in Latin America, such crises were frequent enough to be considered endemic. These debt crises were orchestrated, managed and controlled both to rationalize the system and to redistribute assets during the 1980s and 1990s. Wade and Veneroso (1998, pp. 3–23) capture the essence of this when they write of the Asian crisis (provoked initially by the operation of US-based hedge funds) of 1997–1998:

Financial crises have always caused transfers of ownership and power to those who keep their own assets intact and who are in a position to create credit, and the Asian crisis is no exception...there is no doubt that Western and Japanese corporations are the big winners...The combination of massive devaluations, IMF-pushed financial liberalization, and IMF facilitated recovery may even precipitate the biggest peacetime transfer of assets from domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty years anywhere in the world, dwarfing the transfers from domestic to US owners in Latin America in the 1980s or in Mexico after 1994. One recalls the statement attributed to Andrew Mellon: 'In a depression assets return to their rightful owners.'

The analogy with the deliberate creation of unemployment to produce a pool of low-wage surplus labour convenient for further accumulation is exact.

Valuable assets fall out of use and lose their value. They lie fallow and dormant until capitalists possessed of liquidity choose to seize upon them and breathe new life into them. The danger, however, is that crises might spin out of control and become generalized, or that revolts will arise against the system that creates them. One of the prime functions of state interventions and of international institutions is to orchestrate crises and devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur without sparking a general collapse or popular revolt. The structural adjustment programme administered by the Wall Street/Treasury/IMF complex takes care of the first while it is the job of the comprador neoliberal state apparatus (backed by military assistance from the imperial powers) in the country that has been raided to ensure that the second event does not occur. However, the signs of popular revolt soon began to emerge, first with the Zapatista uprising in Mexico in 1994, and later in the generalized discontent which emerged with the anti-globalization movement that cut its teeth in the revolt at Seattle.

4 State redistributions

The state, once transformed into a neoliberal set of institutions, becomes a prime agent of redistributive policies, reversing the flow from the upper to the lower classes that had occurred during the era of social democratic hegemony. It does this in the first instance through pursuit of privatization schemes and cut-backs in those state expenditures that support the social wage. Even when privatization appears as beneficial to the lower classes, the long-term effects can be negative. At first blush, for example, Thatcher's programme for the privatization of social housing in Britain appeared as a gift to the lower classes which could now convert from rental to ownership at a relatively low cost, gain control over a valuable asset and augment their wealth. But once the transfer was accomplished, housing speculation took over, particularly in prime central locations, eventually bribing or forcing low-income populations out to the periphery in cities such as London, and turning erstwhile working-class housing estates into centres of intense gentrification. The loss of affordable housing in central areas produced homelessness for many and extraordinarily long commutes for those who did have low-paying service jobs. The privatization of the ejidos in Mexico, which became a central component of the neoliberal programme set up during

the 1990s, has had analogous effects upon the prospects for the Mexican peasantry, forcing many rural dwellers off the land into the cities in search of employment. The Chinese state has followed through a whole series of draconian steps in which assets have been conferred on a small elite to the detriment of the mass of the population.

The neoliberal state also seeks redistributions through a variety of other means such as revisions in the tax code to benefit returns on investment rather than incomes and wages, promotion of regressive elements in the tax code (such as sales taxes), displacement of state expenditures and free access to all by user fees (e.g. on higher education), and the provision of a vast array of subsidies and tax breaks to corporations. The corporate welfare programmes that now exist in the US at federal, state and local levels amount to a vast redirection of public moneys for corporate benefit (directly, as in the case of subsidies to agribusiness, and indirectly, as in the case of the military-industrial sector), in much the same way that the mortgage interest rate tax deduction operates in the US as a massive subsidy to upper-income home owners and the construction industry. The rise of surveillance and policing and, in the case of the US, incarceration of recalcitrant elements in the population indicate a more sinister role of intense social control. In the developing countries, where opposition to neoliberalism and accumulation by dispossession can be stronger, the role of the neoliberal state quickly assumes that of active repression even to the point of low-level warfare against oppositional movements (many of which can now conveniently be designated as 'terrorist' so as to garner US military assistance and support), such as the Zapatistas in Mexico or the landless peasant movement in Brazil.

In effect, reports Roy, 'India's rural economy, which supports seven hundred million people, is being garroted. Farmers who produce too much are in distress, farmers who produce too little are in distress, and landless agricultural laborers are out of work as big estates and farms lay off their workers. They're all flocking to the cities in search of employment (Roy, 2001).' In China it is estimated that at least half a billion people will have to be absorbed by urbanization over the next ten years if rural mayhem and revolt is to be avoided. What they will do in the cities remains unclear, though, as we have seen, the vast physical infrastructural plans now in the works will go some way to absorbing the labour surpluses released by primitive accumulation.

The redistributive tactics of neoliberalism are wide-ranging, sophisticated, frequently masked by ideological gambits but devastating for the dignity and social well-being of vulnerable populations and territories. The wave of creative destruction which neoliberalization has visited across the whole landscape of capitalism is unparalleled in the history of capitalism. Understandably, it has spawned resistance and a search for viable alternatives.

Alternatives

Neoliberalism has spawned a swathe of oppositional movements both within and outside of its compass. Many of these movements are radically different from the worker-based movements that dominated before 1980. I say 'many' but not 'all'. Traditional worker-based movements are by no means dead even in the advanced capitalist countries where they have been much weakened by the neoliberal onslaught upon their power. In South Korea and South Africa vigorous labour movements arose during the 1980s, and in much of Latin America working-class parties are flourishing if not in power. In Indonesia a putative labour movement of great potential importance is struggling to be heard. The potentiality for labour unrest in China is immense though quite unpredictable. In addition, it is not clear either that the mass of the working class in the US, which has over this last generation voted consistently against its own material interests for reasons of cultural nationalism, religion and opposition to multiple social movements, will forever stay locked into such a politics by the machinations of Republicans and Democrats alike. Given the volatility, there is no reason to rule out the resurgence of worker-based politics with a strongly anti-neoliberal agenda in future years.

However, struggles against accumulation by dispossession are fomenting quite different lines of social and political conflict. Partly because of the distinctive conditions that give rise to such movements, their political orientation and modes of organization depart markedly from those typical of social democratic politics. The Zapatista rebellion, for example, did not seek to take over state power or accomplish a political revolution. It sought instead a more inclusionary politics to work through the whole of civil society in a more open and fluid search for alternatives that would look to the specific needs of the different social groups and allow them to improve their lot. Organizationally, it tend-

ed to avoid avant-gardism and refused to take the form of a political party. It preferred instead to remain a social movement within the state, attempting to form a political power bloc in which indigenous cultures would be central rather than peripheral. It sought thereby to accomplish something akin to a passive revolution within the territorial logic of state power

The effect of all these movements has been to shift the terrain of political organization away from traditional political parties and labour organizing into a less focused political dynamic of social action across the whole spectrum of civil society. But what it lost in focus it gained in terms of relevance. It drew its strengths from embeddedness in the nitty-gritty of daily life and struggle, but in so doing often found it hard to extract itself from the local and the particular to understand the macro-politics of what neoliberal accumulation by dispossession was and is all about. The variety of such struggles was and is simply stunning. It is hard to even imagine connections between them. They were and are all part of a volatile mix of protest movements that swept the world and increasingly grabbed the headlines during and after the 1980s (Wignaraja, 1993; Brecher *et al.*, 2000; Gills, 2001; Bello, 2002; Mertes, 2004). These movements and revolts were sometimes crushed with ferocious violence, for the most part by state powers acting in the name of 'order and stability'. Elsewhere they produced interethnic violence and civil wars as accumulation by dispossession produced intense social and political rivalries in a world dominated by divide-and-rule tactics on the part of capitalist forces. Client states, supported militarily or in some instances with special forces trained by the major military apparatuses (led by the US with Britain and France playing a minor role), took the lead in a system of repressions and liquidations to ruthlessly check activist movements challenging accumulation by dispossession.

The movements themselves have produced a plethora of ideas regarding alternatives. Some seek to de-link wholly or partially from the overwhelming powers of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. Others seek global social and environmental justice by reform or dissolution of powerful institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank. Still others emphasize the theme of 'reclaiming the commons', thereby signalling deep continuities with struggles of long ago as well as with struggles waged throughout the bitter history of colonialism and imperialism. Some envisage a multitude in motion, or a movement within global civil society, to confront

the dispersed and decentred powers of the neoliberal order, while others more modestly look to local experiments with new production and consumption systems animated by completely different kinds of social relations and ecological practices. There are also those who put their faith in more conventional political party structures with the aim of gaining state power as one step towards global reform of the economic order. Many of these diverse currents now come together at the World Social Forum in an attempt to define their commonalities and to build an organizational power capable of confronting the many variants of neoliberalism and of neoconservatism. There is much here to admire and to inspire.

But what types of conclusions may be derived from an analysis of the sort here constructed? To begin with the whole history of the social democratic compromise and the subsequent turn to neoliberalism indicates the crucial role played by class struggle in either checking or restoring class power. Although it has been effectively disguised, we have lived through a whole generation of sophisticated class struggle on the part of the upper strata in society to restore or, as in China and Russia, to construct, an overwhelming class power. All of this occurred in decades when many progressives were theoretically persuaded that class was a meaningless category and when those institutions from which class struggle had hitherto been waged on behalf of the working classes were under fierce assault. The first lesson we must learn, therefore, is that if it looks like class struggle and acts like class struggle then we have to name it for what it is. The mass of the population has either to resign itself to the historical and geographical trajectory defined by this overwhelming class power or respond to it in class terms.

To put it this way is not to wax nostalgic for some lost golden age when the proletariat was in motion. Nor does it necessarily mean (if it ever should have) that there is some simple conception of the proletariat to which we can appeal as the primary (let alone exclusive) agent of historical transformation. There is no proletarian field of utopian Marxian fantasy to which we can retire. To point to the necessity and inevitability of class struggle is not to say that the way class is constituted is determined or even determinable in advance. Class movements make themselves, though not under conditions of their own choosing, and analysis shows that those conditions are currently bifurcated into movements around expanded reproduction in which the exploitation of wage labour and conditions defining the social wage are the central issues and movements

around accumulation by dispossession in which everything from classic forms of primitive accumulation through practices destructive of cultures, histories and environments to the depredations wrought by the contemporary forms of finance capital are the focus of resistance. Finding the organic link between these different class movements is an urgent theoretical and practical task, but analysis also shows that this has to occur in an historical-geographical trajectory of capital accumulation that is based in increasing connectivity across space and time but marked by deepening uneven geographical developments. This unevenness must be understood as something actively produced and sustained by processes of capital accumulation, no matter how important the signs may be of residuals of past configurations set up in the cultural landscape and the social world.

But analysis also points up exploitable contradictions within the neoliberal agenda. The gap between rhetoric (for the benefit of all) and realization (for the benefit of a small ruling class) increases over space and time and the social movements have done much to focus on that gap. The idea that the market is about competition and fairness is increasingly negated by the facts of extraordinary monopolization, centralization and internationalization of corporate and financial power. The startling increase in class and regional inequalities both within states (such as China, Russia, India, Mexico and Southern Africa) as well as internationally poses a serious political problem that can no longer be swept under the rug as something 'transitional' on the way to a perfected neoliberal world. The neoliberal emphasis upon individual rights and the increasingly authoritarian use of state power to sustain the system become a flashpoint of contentiousness. The more neoliberalism is recognized as a failed if not disingenuous utopian project masking a successful attempt at the restoration of class power, the more it lays the basis for a resurgence of mass movements voicing egalitarian political demands, seeking economic justice, fair trade and greater economic security and democratization.

But it is the profoundly anti-democratic nature of neoliberalism that should surely be the main focus of political struggle. Institutions with enormous power, such as the Federal Reserve, are outside of any democratic control. Internationally the lack of elementary accountability let alone democratic control over institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, to say nothing of the overwhelming private power of financial institutions, makes a mockery of

any serious concern for democratization. To bring back the demands for democratic governance and for economic, political and cultural equality and justice is not to suggest some return to a golden past, since the meanings in each instance have to be re-invented to deal with contemporary conditions and potentialities. The meaning of democracy in ancient Athens has little to do with the meanings we must invest it with today in circumstances as diverse as Sao Paulo, Johannesburg, Shanghai, Manila, San Francisco, Leeds, Stockholm and Lagos. But right across the globe, from China, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Korea as well as South Africa, Iran, India and Egypt, the struggling nations of Eastern Europe as well as into the heartlands of contemporary capitalism, there are groups and social movements in motion that are rallying to reforms that are expressive of some version of democratic values. That is one key focal point of many of the struggles now emerging. The more clearly oppositional movements recognize, however, that their central objective must be to confront the class power that has been so effectively restored under neoliberalization, the more they will likely themselves cohere. Tearing aside the neoliberal mask and exposing its seductive rhetoric, used so effectively to justify and legitimate the restoration of that power, has a significant role to play in such a struggle. It took the neoliberals many years to set up and accomplish their largely successful march through the institutions of contemporary capitalism. We can expect no less of a struggle in pushing in the other direction.

David Harvey
The Graduate Center
The City University of New York
365 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY
USA
E-mail: DHarvey@gc.cuny.edu

Notes

1. See the website <http://www.montpelerin.org/aboutmps.html>.
2. G.W. Bush, 'Securing Freedom's Triumph,' *New York Times*, 11 September, 2002, p. A33. *The National Security Strategy of the United State of America* may be found on the website: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss. See also G.W. Bush, 'President addresses the nation in prime time press conference,' 13 April, 2004; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0420040413-20.html>.

References

- ALCALY, R. and MERMELSTEIN, D. (1977): *The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities*. Vintage, New York.
- ARMSTRONG, P., GLYNN, A. and HARRISON, J. (1991): *Capitalism Since World War II: The Making and Breaking of the Long Boom*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- BELLO, W. (2002): *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy*. Zed Books, London.
- BRECHER, J., COSTELLO, T. and SMITH, B. (2000): *Globalization from below: The Power of Solidarity*. South End Press, Cambridge, MA.
- COURT, J. (2003): *Corporateering: How Corporate Power Steals Your Personal Freedom*. Tarcher Putnam, New York.
- CRAMPTON, T. (2003): Iraqi official urges caution on imposing free market. *New York Times*, 14 October: C5.
- DICKEN, P. (2003): *Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century (4th edn)*. Guilford Press, New York.
- DUMENIL, G. and LEVY, D. (2004): *Neo-liberal Dynamics: A New Phase?* Unpublished.
- EDSALL, T. (1984): *The New Politics of Inequality*. Norton, New York.
- FRANK, T. (2004): *What's the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*. Metropolitan Books, New York.
- GILLS, B. (ed.) (2001): *Globalization and the Politics of Resistance*. Palgrave, New York.
- HARVEY, D. (2003): *The New Imperialism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- JUHASZ, A. (2004): Ambitions of Empire: the Bush Administration economic plan for Iraq (and beyond). *LeftTurn Magazine*, 12 (February/March).
- MERTES, T. (ed.) (2004): *A Movement of Movements*. Verso, London.
- ROY, A. (2001): *Power Politics*. South End Press, Cambridge, MA.
- STIGLITZ, J. (2002): *Globalization and its Discontents*. Norton, New York.
- TABB, W. (1982): *The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis*. Monthly Review Press, New York.
- TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004): *American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality*. American Political Science Association.
- VALDEZ, J. (1995): *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- WADE, R. and VENEROSO, F. (1998): The Asian crisis: the high debt model versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex. *New Left Review*, 228: 3-23.
- WIGNARAJA, P. (ed.) (1993): *New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People*. Zed Books, London.
- WILLIAMS, R. (1958): *Culture and Society, 1780-1850*. Chatto & Windus, London.
- WORLD COMMISSION (ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION) (2004): *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All*. International Labor Office, Geneva.
- YERGIN, D. and STANISLAW, J. (1999): *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and Market Place that is Remaking the Modern World*. Simon & Schuster, New York.